Is there smart money that can be wagered on this war? A new CSIS study shows how victory can be accomplished beyond Ukraine’s superior innovation. Even with a victory, the post-war history will be fraught with capitalist complications beyond the eventual “peace” after a war of attrition. Some form of ‘Marshall Plan’ will likely be a guide. NATO and/or nuclear weapons will be in the future of a very heavily armed Ukrainian state that will be second only to Poland.
“Our military is obviously going to weigh all of the options,” he said. “So far, they have held the city (Bahkmut) but, if need be, they will strategically pull back. Because we are not going to sacrifice all of our people just for nothing.” Alexander Rodnyansky, economic adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, told CNN.
Ukraine is in a different position now due to Russia's strategic aggression, senior adviser for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Mark Cancian said, adding that a stalemate translates to Russian victory due to the Kremlin's occupation of about 18 percent of Ukrainian territory.
He expects the Ukrainians to target the Zaporizhian region, which is "not terribly well held" by Russian forces at this juncture.
"By spring, we will know how it's shaping up," Cancian said. "Russia could make headway in the Donbas."
www.newsweek.com/…
First, the war in Ukraine has become a war of attrition characterized by dug-in forces, trenches, human-wave attacks, artillery barrages, and high casualties on both sides. Russia likely suffered more combat fatalities in Ukraine in the first year of the war than in all of its wars since World War II combined, including the Soviet and Russian wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya. The average rate of Russian regular and irregular soldiers killed per month in Ukraine over the first year of the war was at least 25 times the number killed per month in Russia’s war in Chechnya and at least 35 times the number killed per month in the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan.
Second, Ukraine has performed extraordinarily well against an adversary with a significant advantage in material resources. One factor that has likely contributed to Ukraine’s performance is military innovation, exemplified by Ukraine’s utilization of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) in combined arms operations. Many of Ukraine’s innovations have come from the bottom up, thanks to a military environment that encourages and enables junior officers to seek innovation.
Third, while military innovation will be necessary as the war continues, it will not be sufficient to outweigh the matériel needs of the Ukrainian military, such as air defense systems, long-range artillery, armored vehicles, fighter aircraft, munitions, spare parts, and logistical resources. The West, including the United States, should prepare for a protracted war and long-term support to Ukraine.
As the war of attrition continues, however, it is unlikely that military innovation will be sufficient to outweigh the matériel needs of the Ukrainian military. The West, including the United States, should prepare for a protracted war and long-term support. Ukraine’s needs have evolved from the initial stage of the war when it needed short-range defensive weapons, such as Javelin anti-tank and Stinger anti-air missiles, which were helpful to conduct defensive operations against advancing Russian forces.
Along with training and intelligence, Ukraine now needs advanced systems to conduct offensive operations in a protracted war, such as air defense systems, long-range artillery, armored vehicles, fighter aircraft, and munitions, along with spare parts and training. These types of munitions, weapons systems, and matériel are essential to assisting Ukrainian forces conduct effective counterattacks against dug-in Russian forces... Even defenders in a war of attrition need to pursue operational offensives to wear down the enemy, reduce pressure on vulnerable areas, and satisfy political audiences at home and abroad to continue support.
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In addition, wars of attrition are insatiable consumers of munitions, and their heavy use takes a toll on weapons systems and platforms. On some days the Russian military has launched 50,000 artillery shells at Ukrainian military and civilian positions.[66] Supporting Ukraine through a prolonged war of attrition means supplying them with the munitions the Ukrainian military needs. Ukraine has a strong track record of innovating and integrating Western weapons systems into its military operations over the first year of the war. It should be able to effectively integrate new weapons systems into its arsenal.
Ukraine needs munitions, weapons systems, logistics, training, and intelligence at the appropriate scale. Russia still has an advantage over Ukraine in the number of munitions and the quality of some weapons systems—such as long-range artillery, advanced fixed-wing aircraft, and naval capabilities—though Ukrainian military innovation has been impressive. U.S. and other Western military aid to date has been helpful, though sometimes too slow. Moving forward, the U.S. and Western defense industrial bases will be essential for a long, grinding war of attrition.
www.csis.org/...
Graham Allison, a professor of government at Harvard, reconsiders what it would mean to win in Ukraine. A new Cold War, he writes, might not be the worst outcome. Could Ukraine become the West Germany of the 21st century?
If the answers to these four questions are roughly right, we should expect the future of Europe to be defined by a new Cold War with Ukraine on the front line, NATO right behind it and a long wait for a post-Soviet Russia to come to its senses.
- First: If what is at stake is not just Ukraine’s survival but the future of Europe and even the global order, why are there no American troops fighting on the battlefield alongside brave Ukrainians?
- Second: Is CIA Director William J. Burns right when he asserts that Ukraine is a war that Putin “doesn’t believe he can afford to lose”?
- Third: If the fighting somehow ended today, would anyone have a doubt about who won and who lost?
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Fourth: If we imagine a map of Europe in 2030 and weigh the factors that could shape Ukraine’s place on it, how much would it matter whether the killing stopped 100 miles to the east or west of the current line of control?
www.washingtonpost.com/...
The external limits of territories (borders) and the internal delimitations within societies (boundaries) have long been thought of in different terms: immigration, nationality and citizenship in the first case; racial, ethnic, religious, caste and class differentiation in the second.
- The Kremlin may leverage an amendment to Russia’s Criminal Code increasing punishments for "discrediting" the war in Ukraine to promote further self-censorship measures among the critical ultranationalist community, prompting pushback from Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and prominent milbloggers.
- A New York Times (NYT) investigation into catastrophic Russian losses during the recent Russian offensive near Vuhledar indicates the Russian military remains unable to rapidly fix the endemic challenges posed by severe personnel and equipment losses.
- Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Chinese President Xi Jinping signed a package of 16 documents that may facilitate Russian sanctions evasion by channeling Chinese aid to Russia through Belarus.
- US officials continue to report that Ukrainian forces are properly using Western-provided weapons in Ukraine.
- Russian and occupation authorities may be attempting to further limit the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) presence at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to compel the de facto recognition of Russian ownership of the plant.
- Politico reported that Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić is seemingly reconsidering Serbia’s close ties to Russia during the war in Ukraine, spurred in part by ongoing Wagner Group recruitment and subversion efforts in Serbia.
- Russian forces are fortifying positions on the international border in Belgorod Oblast.
- Russian forces advanced within Bakhmut and continued ground attacks around Bakhmut and in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area.
- Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
- Russian forces continue defensive operations in southern Ukraine.
- Russian occupation authorities continue to struggle with the administrative management of occupied areas.
A New York Times (NYT) investigation into catastrophic Russian losses during the recent Russian offensive near Vuhledar indicates that the Russian military remains unable to rapidly fix the endemic challenges posed by severe personnel and equipment losses. NYT reported on March 1 that Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces continued to make serious mistakes and advance tank columns into Ukrainian ambushes in the recent three-week Russian offensive near Vuhledar, which Ukrainian sources characterized as the largest tank battle of the war to date.[8] NYT reported that Russian forces lost at least 130 tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) during the three-week offensive, forcing them to resort in the last week to frontal infantry attacks.[9] Ukrainian troops outlined their tactics to NYT, stating they lured Russian forces into kill zones before immobilizing Russian columns and channeling them into mine-laden road shoulders, before destroying them with artillery - including HIMARS, typically used against static, rear area targets.[10] The Russian elements deployed to the Vuhledar area, primarily the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, are mainly staffed with poorly trained mobilized personnel who suffered massive losses in this area in October 2022 and again in February 2023. ISW previously reported on Russian losses near Vuhledar and assessed that they are emblematic of the Russian military‘s inability to learn from its failures.[11] The NYT investigation supports ISW’s assessment that the continued recreation and reinforcement of Russian military failures will impede the Russian military’s ability to conduct effective offensive operations.[12]
www.understandingwar.org/...
“To battle!”
Perhaps no weapon symbolizes the ferocious violence of war more than the main battle tank. Tanks have loomed over the conflict in Ukraine in recent months — militarily and diplomatically — as both sides prepared for offensives. Russia pulled reserves of tanks from Cold War-era storage, and Ukraine prodded Western governments to supply American Abrams and German Leopard 2 tanks.
The sophisticated Western tanks are expected on the battlefield in the next several months. The new Russian armor turned up earlier — and in its first wide-scale deployment was decimated.
A three-week battle on a plain near the coal-mining town of Vuhledar in southern Ukraine produced what Ukrainian officials say was the biggest tank battle of the war so far, and a stinging setback for the Russians.
Blown up on mines, hit with artillery or obliterated by anti-tank missiles, the charred hulks of Russian armored vehicles now litter farm fields all about Vuhledar, according to Ukrainian military drone footage. Ukraine’s military said Russia had lost at least 130 tanks and armored personnel carriers in the battle. That figure could not be independently verified. Ukraine does not disclose how many weapons it loses.
www.nytimes.com/...
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1— Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces are fortifying positions on the international border in Belgorod Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 1 that Russian forces deployed engineering equipment and are installing anti-tank mines in Novostroivka Vtoraya and Gorkovskii, Belgorod Oblast—approximately 47km northwest of Kharkiv City.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff did not observe Russian forces forming offensive groups in the northern Kharkiv Oblast direction, and such fortifications further indicate that Russian forces are not preparing for renewed offensive operations in the area.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces conducted ground attacks around Bakhmut on March 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops continue to advance in the Bakhmut direction and attacked Bakhmut itself; north of Bakhmut near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest), Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest), and Bohdanivka (8km northwest); west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske (5km west), Chasiv Yar (10km west), and Khromove (3km west); and southwest of Bakhmut near Bila Hora (15km southwest).[36] Geolocated footage posted on March 1 confirms that Russian forces made advances on the southern outskirts of Bakhmut.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group fighters have consolidated control of the outskirts of Yahidne (1km northwest of Bakhmut) and are moving southwest towards Khromove, though Ukrainian forces retain access to the Khromove-Bakhmut route.[38] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Wagner troops have advanced within Bakhmut near the meat processing plant and up to the bank of the Bakhmutivka River, which runs through eastern Bakhmut.[39] Russian sources continue to claim that Russian troops are attacking Ukrainian positions along the T0504 Kostiatynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway near Ivanivske and that Ukrainian troops are withdrawing from Chasiv Yar.[40] While some Russian sources claim that the situation in Bakhmut is worsening for Ukrainian troops, Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that Ukraine is transferring large numbers of reserves to the area.[41]
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continue defensive operations in southern Ukraine. Head of the Ukrainian Joint Coordination Press Center of the Southern Forces Nataliya Humenyuk stated on March 1 that Russian forces are forming secondary defensive lines in Kherson Oblast in case Russian forces need to withdraw further to the rear in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.[52] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 1 that Russian forces remain on the defensive in southern Ukraine but are attempting to set conditions for future offensive operations, as ISW noted on February 28.[53] Images published on February 28 show new Russian trenches and concrete defenses in an unspecified area of Zaporizhia Oblast.[54]