As troubling as reports of the human toll of the war are, the actual fatality numbers are likely more even, as reported by the US DoD weeks ago.
The full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has provided an invaluable opportunity to assess the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) and the implications of a range of capabilities for modern warfare. Many publicly made judgements on these issues have lacked supporting data or insight into Ukrainian operational planning and decision-making. To ensure that those drawing lessons from the conflict do so from a solid foundation, this report seeks to outline key lessons, based on the operational data accumulated by the Ukrainian General Staff, from the fighting between February and July 2022. As the underlying source material for much of this report cannot yet be made public, this should be understood as testimony rather than as an academic study. Given the requirements for operational security, it is necessarily incomplete.
Russia planned to invade Ukraine over a 10-day period and thereafter occupy the country to enable annexation by August 2022. The Russian plan presupposed that speed, and the use of deception to keep Ukrainian forces away from Kyiv, could enable the rapid seizure of the capital. The Russian deception plan largely succeeded, and the Russians achieved a 12:1 force ratio advantage north of Kyiv. The very operational security that enabled the successful deception, however, also led Russian forces to be unprepared at the tactical level to execute the plan effectively. The Russian plan’s greatest deficiency was the lack of reversionary courses of action. As a result, when speed failed to produce the desired results, Russian forces found their positions steadily degraded as Ukraine mobilised. Despite these setbacks, Russia refocused on Donbas and, since Ukraine had largely expended its ammunition supply, proved successful in subsequent operations, slowed by the determination – rather than the capabilities – of Ukrainian troops. From April, the West became Ukraine’s strategic depth, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) only robbed Russia of the initiative once long-range fires brought Russian logistics under threat.
The tactical competence of the Russian military proved significantly inferior compared with the expectations of many observers based within and outside Ukraine and Russia. Nevertheless, Russian weapons systems proved largely effective, and those units with a higher level of experience demonstrated that the AFRF have considerable military potential, even if deficiencies in training and the context of how they were employed meant that the Russian military failed to meet that potential. Factoring in the idiosyncrasies of the Russian campaign, there are five key areas that should be monitored to judge whether the Russian military is making progress in resolving its structural and cultural deficiencies. These areas should be used to inform assessments of Russian combat power in the future.
rusi.org/...
Zelenskyy warns Ukraine could suffer more Russian attacks this week
Ukrainian officials have warned that they are expecting to face a new wave of Russian missile strikes in the next few days.
"The coming week could be as difficult as last week," President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in his nightly video address on Sunday.
Previous missile strikes on Ukrainian territory have targeted the country's energy infrastructure, causing massive water and power cuts.
"Our defence forces are preparing, the whole state is preparing," Zelenskyy said. "And as long as they have missiles, they, unfortunately, will not calm down."
"We are working out all the scenarios, including with Western partners," he added, calling on Ukrainians to pay attention to anti-aircraft warnings.
Millions of people -- including most of the capital Kyiv -- were left without power last week as winter temperatures set in.
According to the national operator Ukrenergo, around 27% of households are still facing electricity shortages while emergency power cuts are still in force throughout the country.
The mayor of Kyiv, Vitali Klitschko, has traded barbs with Ukraine's president over how to help residents withstand power cuts.
Zelenskyy had noted last week that many in the capital had complained about the city's measures following Russia's attacks, but Klitschko said 430 "warming centres" were already helping residents cope and said any dispute was "senseless" amid Russia's military campaign.
"I do not want to become involved in political battles, particularly in the current situation," Klitschko said in a video posted on Telegram.
www.euronews.com/...
Russian efforts around Bakhmut indicate that Russian forces have fundamentally failed to learn from previous high-casualty campaigns concentrated on objectives of limited operational or strategic significance. Russian forces have continually expended combat strength on small settlements around Bakhmut since the end of May; in the following six months, they have only secured gains on the order of a few kilometers at a time.[1] As ISW has previously observed, Russian efforts to advance on Bakhmut have resulted in the continued attrition of Russian manpower and equipment, pinning troops on relatively insignificant settlements for weeks and months at a time.[2] This pattern of operations closely resembles the previous Russian effort to take Severodonetsk and Lysychansk earlier in the war. As ISW assessed throughout June and July of this year, Ukrainian forces essentially allowed Russian troops to concentrate efforts on Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, two cities near the Luhansk Oblast border of limited operational and strategic significance, in order to capitalize on the continued degradation of Russian manpower and equipment over the course of months of grinding combat.[3] Russian troops eventually captured Lysychansk and Severodonetsk and reached the Luhansk Oblast border, but that tactical success translated to negligible operational benefit as the Russian offensive in the east then culminated. Russian efforts in this area have remained largely stalled along the lines that they reached in early July. Even if Russian troops continue to advance toward and within Bakhmut, and even if they force a controlled Ukrainian withdrawal from the city (as was the case in Lysychansk), Bakhmut itself offers them little operational benefit. The costs associated with six months of brutal, grinding, and attrition-based combat around Bakhmut far outweigh any operational advantage that the Russians can obtain from taking Bakhmut. Russian offensives around Bakhmut, on the other hand, are consuming a significant proportion of Russia’s available combat power, potentially facilitating continued Ukrainian counteroffensives elsewhere.
www.understandingwar.org/...
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued to make incremental advances south of Bakhmut on November 30. Geolocated footage posted between November 28 and 29 shows Ukrainian troops claiming to be encircled by Russian troops on the eastern side of Kurdiumivka, about 12km southwest of Bakhmut.[27] Russian sources circulated conflicting reports on the status of control of Kurdiumivka, with some reporting that Ukrainian troops still control the western half of the settlement and that fighting is ongoing while some claimed that Russian troops have taken full control of the settlement and are in the process of clearing Ukrainian positions.[28] ISW has only observed visual confirmation of the former and assesses that Russian troops made gains in the eastern half of Kurdiumivka.[29] Geolocated footage posted on November 30 also shows slight Russian advances on the southeastern and northeastern outskirts of Bakhmut itself.[30]
Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Bakhmut on November 30. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled attempted Russian attacks near Bakhmutske (10km northeast of Bakhmut) and Bilohorivka (20km northeast of Bakhmut).[31] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian troops entirely captured Bilohorivka, although ISW has not observed independent confirmation of this claim.[32] Russian and Ukrainian sources indicated that Wagner Group fighters, largely including mobilized prisoners, and elements of both the 1st and 2nd Army Corps (troops of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, respectively) are responsible for operations in the Bakhmut area.[33]
Russian forces additionally continued ground attacks in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area and routine fire in western Donetsk Oblast on November 30. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian troops unsuccessfully attacked Pervomaiske, Nevelske, and Marinka, all along the western outskirts of Donetsk City.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, particularly soldiers of the BARS-11 (Combat Reserve) ”Kuban” Cossack detachment, are fighting within Marinka.[35] Russian sources posted combat footage of Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) artillerymen striking Ukrainian positions near Avdiivka.[36] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian troops continued unsuccessful attempts to regain lost positions southwest of Donetsk City near Vuhledar, and Russian troops continued routine fire along the line of contact around Donetsk City and in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.[37]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued defensive measures on the east bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast on November 30. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are conducting positional defense on the east bank of the Dnipro River.[38] Ukrainian media outlet Hromadske posted a video on November 30 showing Ukrainian forces positioned under the Antonivskiy bridge on the west bank of the Dnipro River engaging in small arms and RPG fire with Russian forces across the river on the east bank.[39] Ukrainian soldiers interviewed by Hromadske stated that they are part of units in extremely forward positions tasked with preventing Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups from crossing the river.[40] The Ukrainian soldiers also stated that Russian forces have several observation posts on the east bank from which they direct artillery fire.[41] Russian forces may have units on the east bank near the water line to prevent Ukrainian reconnaissance and sabotage groups from crossing the river and to offer positions from which Russian forces can better shell Kherson City and surrounding settlements.
www.understandingwar.org/...
The full paper can be found here. "this report seeks to outline key lessons, based on the operational data accumulated by the Ukrainian General Staff, from the fighting between February and July 2022."
The paper includes the most detailed and accurate account to date of the first phase of the war. "Many Russian soldiers arrived in towns [in the north] without their weapons loaded. They were – for the most part – not anticipating heavy fighting"
static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine…
The contrast between north & south shows that the Russian invasion was not foreordained to fail. "The destruction of Mariupol...demonstrates the difference that could have been made elsewhere if Russian forces were properly prepared for heavy fighting."
static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine…
One key lesson. "There is no sanctuary in modern warfare. The enemy can strike throughout operational depth." One answer is hardened protection. Another is deception. But ultimately the best way to survive is to move fast & keep moving.
economist.com/europe/2022/11…
Deception works. Ukraine photographed damage to airfields and printed the resulting pattern on to big sheets. "This led ... amusingly to the Russians debating whether Ukrainian fighter aircraft were operating from subterranean shelters"
static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine…
Drones vital for intelligence, but eye-watering attrition. 90% of drones Ukraine deployed Feb-July were destroyed. Average life expectancy of fixed-wing drone was six flights; that of a quadcopter a paltry three. How long would European fleets survive?
Electronic warfare played (and is playing) a big role. But "fratricide is a systemic issue between Russian systems," notes the RUSI report. One example is Khibiny EW pod on Russian aircraft.
static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine…
HIMARS genuinely marked a turning point: "The introduction of HIMARS and M270 firing GMLRS into the UAF therefore can be seen as the point where the Russian offensive on Donbas ended and the war entered a new phase". But authors are cagey on details.
static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine…
At peak in Donbas Russia using "more ammunition in two days than entire British military has in stock". At Ukr rates of use UK stocks would "potentially last a week." UK lacks firepower to deliver kind of blunting effect that UAF achieved north of Kyiv"
static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine…
"The oft-cited refrain of
@DefenceHQ that these deficiencies are not a problem because the UK fights alongside NATO allies would be more credible if the situation...were much better among any of the UK’s European allies. It is not, except in Finland."
static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine…
RUSI: "The historical approach of the [ARRC] and 3 UK Division of erecting tented cities – command posts with a large physical footprint – is non-viable in wartime on the modern battlefield. These sites will be identified and struck."
On which topic, see:
Russian missiles not duds. "For the most part, the Russian missile systems are reliable and accurate...Russians routinely adapted flight routes for every mission and such missiles were observed to make up to 80 changes of course on their way to a target."
static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine…
Russia "can fabricate around 100 Kalibr missiles per year, for example, and this may come at the expense of other munitions because many Russian munitions have common key modules that act as bottlenecks in the production of multiple systems"
static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine…
Survival depends on "defeating precision". Three main ways to do it: stop a launcher from determining its own position, preventing enemy from locating you, or interfering with "mechanism for precision strike" (e.g. jamming its navigation signals with EW)
static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine…