The atrocities of the civil war in Syria are painfully vivid. Captured in videos looped endlessly on cable news and the internet, the images of children dying in agony so shock and horrify us that we feel in our very guts, in Donald Trump’s words, “something has to be done.” Trump’s “something done” is launching 59 Tomahawk missiles. And now what? Now we wait? Wait for what? We wait for consequences — intended and unintended.
What are the unintended consequences of our actions? As history teaches us (from Tonkin Gulf to the Twin Towers), we can never accurately predict what those consequences will be. However if there is one supreme lesson (as Lyndon Johnson and Osama bin Laden, to their dismay, could attest) it is that the unintended consequences often far outweigh the intended ones — and not to our benefit. This is a lesson, repeated endlessly though history, that we ignore to our great peril.
If we can not predict the unintended consequences, what, at least, may we say are the intended ones? Is it to send a message (to Syria? Russia? Iran? North Korea? China? our allies?) ? If so what is/are the message[s]:
— to prevent any future chemical attacks — in Syria? the Middle East? the world;
— to effect “Regime Change?” and if so, to replace the regime with what?
— to warn our potential adversaries — Russia, Iran, North Korea, China (with what warning[s]) ?
And here is the problem with Trump’s “something has to be done” response: while it is viscerally, emotionally satisfying, it is utterly disconnected from any rationally thought out intentional consequence. It is heartfelt, but “full hearts” without “clear eyes” lead to blind folly.
We might start to see with clear eyes by looking at the Syrian Civil War through the lens of (to use Goya’s words) another “Disaster of War” — the Spanish Civil War — which though eight decades in the past, is surprisingly analogous. History, of course, never quite repeats itself exactly, but by thoughtful consideration, we may still draw lessons so that we are not doomed to repeat its worst chapters.
Like the current civil war in Syria, the Spanish Civil War was a complex one involving many disparate factions with conflicting goals often tenuously allied by only the common interest of self-preservation. On one side: Franco’s fascist Falange allied with the army officer corp, the die-hard Royalists, the conservative business interests, the old-line traditionalist hierarchy of the Catholic Church; opposing them: the Republican government; labor unions, socialists, communists, liberal democrats, Catholic reformers, minority communities (Basques, Catalonians, etc). And like the current situation while the over-arching bloody conflict between the two sides raged on, equally desperate power struggles occurred within each side ultimately resulting it the dominance of one faction on each side (the fascist Falange party and the Army on Franco’s side; and the extreme left, Communist influenced factions on the other side).
Today in Syria the government side is composed of various factions among them: the Baathist Party of Asaad’s regime, the army, Alewives, Christians and some other minorities, Shias, and allied forces from other countries (Hezbollah, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, etc). Opposition forces include a diverse range of rebel militias, Isis, Kurdish militia, etc. As in Spain 80 years ago, these forces on both sides of the central civil war are often engaged in desperate internecine warfare among themselves.
The central point here is that the range of “intentional consequences” for the U.S. in these internal struggles is extremely limited. Other than degrading Isis forces through already ongoing U.S. concerted military action, the truth seems to be that we can do little to control which factions will ultimately prevail in these internal struggles. And that may have to be an adequate “intentional consequence” as far as the composition of opposition forces goes — unless we are going to go for the Full-Monty-Boots-on-the-Ground Iraq style option (with about as much likely success as we have enjoyed in Iraq).
However, the Spanish Civil War illuminates another set of possible “Intentional Consequences” so that we may choose to see the current Syrian Civil War with “Clear Eyes” as well as “Full Hearts.” For that eight decade old conflict was in fact a sort of “Wayang Kulit” or Shadow Puppet theater controlled by the “Dalangs” or Puppet Masters behind the scene of the more obvious conflict. Behind Franco and his minions, Mussolini and even more Hitler were preparing for a much greater tragedy — World War II. Indeed, Guernica itself was a practice run for the Nazi dive-bombing and strafing of innocent civilians which proved so “successful” in laying the groundwork for the London Blitz four years later.
Nor were the Germans and Italians the only puppet masters behind the scenes. The French and far more the Soviets provided support for those who fought against Franco (an isolationist 1930’s America was not interested in participating in the puppet theater going on behind the scenes) . Logistically and strategically, Stalin did not have the same resources that Hitler had, but he did nonetheless profit from the conflict: a proxy war with the Nazis gave the Soviets some valuable insights into German intentions and capabilities; and Stalin also refined the Communists’ mastery of “fifth column” fellow-traveler stratagems. It is possible that these alone were more than adequate “intentional consequences” for Stalin; he was not nearly as invested as Hitler in actually winning that civil war.
The central lesson of the Puppet Show Theater behind the Spanish Civil War is that today in Syria the U.S. must pay attention to the “Puppet Show” behind the scenes of the surface conflict. And we must plan for “intentional consequences” that deal with the Puppet Masters.
At the moment the Puppet Masters behind the opposition to Assad are the Arab Gulf States, Jordan, Turkey and the U.S., while those behind Assad are principally Russia and Iran (in particular the powerful Revolutionary Guard faction). As Hitler was for Franco, the Puppet Masters behind Assad are far more motivated and far more invested in his victory than the Puppet Masters behind the opposition.
And this is where Trump’s “Something has to be done” becomes critical. We must understand that the Russians role in Syria bears more than a passing resemblance to the Germans in 1936-9 Spain. For both it is a test — a test of Military-Political strategy, and a test of will vis a vis their adversaries. An unequivocal Assad triumph reinforces Russian confidence in expansionism (already evident in Ukraine) and establishes for the first time an historic Geo-Military- Political stronghold on the Mediterranean (on the very doorstep, one should add, of Israel). It also, more than incidentally, strengthens the hand of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard both internationally and at home in its conflict with the more pragmatic moderates. These are consequences that set up truly nightmarish scenarios for the future of the Western Democracies.
What then should the “something has to be done” be to achieve the desired “intentional consequences.” First and foremost, we must focus not on the puppets but on the puppet masters. That may sound cold and perhaps even inhumane (think of the gassed children). But we must remember that Guernica happened not because of Franco, but because of the ambitions of the Puppet Master Hitler and the Germans. So too if we do not check mate the Russians and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, we may someday face our own contemporary version of the Blitz.
That does not mean the “something has to be done” should aim at the immediate overthrow of Assad. We may actually better achieve our ends by remembering the nearly decade-long Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (or, for that matter, our own decade in Vietnam). Our intention need not (and, in terms of weakening the Puppet Master, probably should not) be to achieve short term total defeat of Assad (and by extension, his Russian and Iranian Puppet Masters), but rather to control the long-term outcome — to weaken the capabilities and the will of the Puppet Masters.
We cannot know with any certainty the consequences of such long-term intention. And even less can we predict the unintended consequences. But neither can we simply follow blindly our “full hearts” without at least trying to see with “clear eyes.” With such hearts, tempered by such eyes, we may, in John Kennedy’s words, “bear the burden of a long twilight struggle...against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself.”