Based on years of research and activism on war, peace, and revolutions (see “On Methods” at the end of this) I’ve made the following predictions about the current War in Ukraine, as of March 10, 2022.
March 11th
Seems somewhat likely Russians are not going to attack Odessa soon, but are heading straight north from Crimea in an attempt to cut off Eastern Ukraine and surround Kiev from the South as well as North. There is a push to the east of Kiev as well. This shows Russian refocusing from their earlier unachievable goals.
Will it work? Very long supply lines from the south to the north. In the east there has been surprisingly little progress. Another overextension seems likely.
The true Siege of Kiev begins. It could last months. It could fail.
Predicted outcomes:
Over in 5 days militarily with Russian occupation (5%)
Over in 15 days militarily with Russian occupation (10%)
Over in 15 days politically with Ukraine in control (10%)
Over in 1 month militarily with Russian occupation (25%)
Ended in 1 month politically, with Ukraine in control (25%)
Over militarily in three months, with Russian occupation (20%)
Over militarily within three months, with Ukrainian victory (5%)
Weapons of Mass Destruction?
Although I try and stay up on things, I have to admit that I didn’t really notice Putin was becoming an absolute dictator at the level of Stalin. After Stalin the Russian elite ruled pretty collectively, as China did until recently. In the brief democratic period there was… some democracy. But since Putin came to power there has been the end of democracy and an increasingly personal dictatorship. Now he is a power alone, and probably not as mentally stable as he once was.
His focus on a truly fascist version of Russian nationalism is particularly dangerous.
The incredible corruption in Russian society has produced a military that is more paper bear than grizzly. Secure networks are down, logistics are a failure. Many soldiers are conscripts (from the still horrible draft system) and were lied to. They are actually going hungry.
Taking these factors into account would explain the invasion and why it is going so poorly. It also made predicting the switch to mass shelling and bombing of civilians pretty much inevitable. It also means that:
March 11 Escalation predictions
Chance Putin uses one or more tactical nuclear weapons: 10%
Chance Putin uses biological or chemical weapons: 10%
Chance of escalation into open conflict with NATO: 20%
Chance of regional nuclear war: 5%
Russia’s allies (especially Syria) have used chemical and biological weapons and Russia has the capability, but it seems unlikely to me they will deploy them here, despite claiming Ukraine has them. They just don’t work well. Their best effect is as terror weapons and the Ukrainians clearly are not easy to scare. The same goes for tactical nukes, but they would be to terrorize Europe and the U.S. It won’t work, but Putin will soon be desperate.
The open use of Thermobaric weapons (Fuel Air Munitions that produce a cloud of flammable vapor which is then detonated, creating a blast of overpressure with massive heat) is a bad sign. Many people have called for them to be banned.
Ukraine militarily
I thought there would be significant conventional military resistance for sure. Ukraine’s updated military and social change since 2014 promised that. I knew there would be massive civil disobedience, and likely sabotage and other operations-other-than-war.
I have to admit, that the rottenness in the Russian military caused by the incredible corruption in the country, and the courage and organization of the Ukraine military and leadership did surprise me. That Russia would fail in almost all of their goals two weeks in seemed a low probability (10%). But that Ukraine military resistance would last weeks seemed pretty likely (50%). And that Ukraine would win in the long run (maybe very long run of decades) seemed 95%. Genocide and ethnic cleansing being the only way to eradicate Ukrainian identity. After all, 45 years after conquest Eastern Europe threw out most of the puppet Communist regimes and many nations, integrated directly into the Soviet Empire, achieved independence, including Ukraine which had been occupied for even longer, 70 years.
In the summer of 1989 I was in Moscow for a month at a big conference (as a grad student). The head of the Soviet Military announced the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe. They did leave and in weeks the Wall came down and the Soviet Empire spiraled to its end. Talking to Russians, Georgians, and Ukrainians I asked them if places like Georgia and the Ukraine would become independent. Many thought Georgia would (all the Georgians, for example). But nobody thought Ukraine would become independent. But I thought it very well might. It has a long history of identity and many special grievances against the Russian Empire. The current invasion is only the latest.
Now I would say there is a good chance Kiev will never be occupied (40%, see above).
After one week I predicted the current strategy of shelling and bombing to be overwhelmingly likely (95%). Only a Russian withdrawal (they could always claim victory) was possible otherwise. Massive civilian casualties became inevitable. Look at Grozny and Aleppo.
I would say there is a high chance Russia will never militarily occupy the whole country (80%). While I am not as optimistic as Peter Orlandt, who sees Ukrainian military victory in just a month or so (“2 weeks after the group firms up”) as almost certain, he does make some good points about intelligence (excellent for Ukraine thanks to the West), logistics (good for Ukraine because of internal supply lines) and other issues.
Ukraine long term (years)
Ukraine will win. It could well get Donbas back, possibly even the Crimea. But it will be costly. Below I estimate death totals, and one can extrapolate from deaths to at least as many permanently injured and three times as many (or more) seriously injured.
Deaths will range from—
Now (March 11, 2022):
5-10,000 Ukranian troops; 10-20,000 civilians; 5-10,000 Russian troops
If fighting goes three months:
30-50,00 Ukranian troops; 50-500,000 civilians; 30-50,000 Russian troops
If there is an extended guerrilla war:
100-200,000 Ukranian troops; 1-2 million civilians; 100-200,000 Russian troops
Putin long term
Originally I thought invading Ukraine would weaken him, but not fatally. After the first week, the chances of him significantly being weakened increased to 50%, but unlikely to fall (5%). By March 11, he is certainly significantly weakened, no way back. Chances of losing power within 3 years, now 50%.
Invasion?
Before the invasion started I did think Putin would attack (95%), but most likely just by occupying the breakaway regions (50%). Next most likely was taking the whole of the two provinces (20%), and perhaps the source of Crimean water and link Crimea to Donbas and achieve Sea of Azov control (15%). Then, maybe, he’d be so crazy as to try and take everything up to the Dniper River, all of Eastern Ukraine, but not Kiev (10%). I thought there was only a very small (5%) chance he’d do what he did.
(Note: Once he acted militarily, the breakdown equals 100%. All invasion predictions are cumulative.)
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On Methods
It is striking how many experts predicted Putin would never invade. And how many of them then predicted Ukraine would be swiftly occupied. And how many of them, as of this date (March 11, 2022) are predicting that soon Kiev will fall and the Ukraine will collapse.
I do admire those experts who dare to predict. Many people who claim to know shit don’t predict anything, so how can we know how accurate their analysis is?
So I’m making public my own estimates of what is likely to transpire in the Ukraine War. There is hardly ever a 100% prediction for nontrivial events. I use percentages. That is how my mind works as well. Every % should be followed by a “?”. These are just estimates. And remember, a certain percentage of the time, the unlikely does happen. Predicting Trump has a 5% chance of winning in 2016 was not 0%. Still, I clearly did not know as much about the American voters as I thought I did because I really blew that one.
My expertise goes back to my childhood, starting at 5 living in Saigon where my father was a civil engineer. I was fascinated by war and had committed to being a U.S. Marine by the time I was 6. That lasted until I became an anti-war activist at 19, deciding the dangers of communism were less than the grief being brought on two countries I loved (Vietnam and the U.S.)
After 15 years of working class jobs and peace and other activism, often organizing among active duty U.S. military folks, I went to graduate school to research war and peace more formally. This became a Ph.D. (History of Consciousness, UCSC 1991) and eventually two books: Postmodern War: The New Politics of Conflict (1997) free online and Peace, War and Computers (2005). The second one should have been called Terror War, as it explains how the end of the Cold War was really only a transition into an anti-Terror Cold War II. Now we’re seeing (strangely enough as finally the Terror War has become less salient) a return to Cold War I.
Anyway, all this (and more) academic writing and activism informs my analysis, and therefore shapes my predictions. For current data I use Live Map (and have for every conflict since the Libyan Revolution), Bellingcat, many online articles and twitter threads.
I should also confess that I am prone to optimism. What else would you expect from someone who has managed to stay an anarchist-feminist revolutionary for over 50 years? So take that into account. Yes, I predicted the U.S. would lose in Vietnam in 1971, and that the Soviet Union would lose in Afghanistan on the day they invaded, and that the U.S. would lose in Afghanistan on the day they invaded, and since the 1970s that the Soviet Empire would collapse. I also made a number of predictions about Trump and his coup attempt that I feel good about. But then again, I did not predict Trump getting elected. I’m still trying to get over that! And in Postmodern War, 35 years ago, I thought nuclear weapons would be used by now. I am so glad I was wrong about that. But then, the weapons are still at-the-ready.
Love and Rage, c