It has been a bumpy ride for US Foreign Policy in Asia since the Obama Administration decided to re-engage after neglect by the Bush Administration.
After inserting itself back into regional politics when Robert Gates and Hilary Clinton's went client shopping in SE Asia using territorial disputes as currency, and outlining the doctrine in Clinton's "America's Pacific Century", Obama announced his "Pivot to Asia" in a speech to the Australian Parliament in November 2011, a policy to raise America's profile by redeploying military assets and pursuing a muscular policy of military and economic engagement, promoting the Trans-Pacific-Partnership or "TPP" as a cornerstone.
The wisdom of this policy is still in question and the effects have been less than positive as, alternately, US presence and absence has aggravated rather than calmed disputes, and there have been precious few returns in terms of tangible benefits; even the TPP is languishing as the process drags on and the secrecy of negotiations - which include corporate actors but exclude the public and the media - becomes a source of public concern and opposition grows in the vacuum of official silence.
The only very positive outcome was the successful re-engagement with Myanmar, where Clinton's outreach to opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and moderate members of the military junta helped to turn the country toward reform and development, although it remains very much a work in progress and a steep uphill slog. History will be kind to Clinton for that if not the remainder of her accomplishments in Asia.
Consequentially, in 2013 the Administration re-branded the policy from the confrontational rhetoric of a military "pivot" to a "rebalancing", taking a less confrontational stance (well, relatively) as Gates and Clinton left the scene, and tried to put out some of the fires they lit. Clearly this backfired when client nations emboldened by the promise of American military support staked similarly assertive positions, only to find themselves neglected as the Administration's attention was diverted by events in Syria and Ukraine and gave some hawkish boosters a sad.
Obama's recent trip to Asia was intended to bolster both the military and economic policy objectives. It was successful in terms of concluding a new military agreement with The Philippines, and at least clarifying the US position on it's backing of Japan in disputes with it's neighbors, reaffirming the territorial division the US itself dictated in the post WWII period and answering doubts about the future of US military forces based in Japan. And giving John Kerry a break from delivering short, off the cuff speeches. Lobbying on the TPP was less successful as regional leaders grappled with opposition in their own countries.
Notably, Obama did not visit China.
Central to Obama's "rebalancing" of his Asia policy is the complex and contentious relationship between the US and China, and China's rise as a global economic power as well as a regional political and military power.
While steadfastly denying it intends to "contain" China, no serious Foreign Policy analyst including supporters of his pivot denny that is one of the key objectives and hawks tend to tout it, while serious questions persist how the military resources can be paid for.
With the change of Chinese government last year, many had hoped China and the US could make a fresh start, and an early summit between Obama and Xi at Rancho Mirage in June 2013 raised hopes; these proved also to be a mirage as Obama spurned Xi proposal for a "special relationship" and went on the offensive taking Xi to task for "Cyber Spying" - just after Edward Snowden's disclosures from Hong Kong and Foreign Policy's profile of NSA-TAO spying operations on China. Despite the usual face-saving "friendship", little more was accomplished then establishing a working relationship and agreeing to disagree. And Obama discovered Xi was not the shy, deferential Hu Jintao or user-friendly Wen Jiabao when Xu pushed back with some Cyber Security complaints of his own, reportedly armed with paper.
Since then the US and China have taken steps forward and back, but as events in Europe cast a Cold War shadow across the globe, Obama's return to Asia last month was clearly calculated to send China a message and it is not a happy one.
The past week or so has thrown the troubles into high contrast; factories burning in Vietnam, China receiving Russian President Vladimir Putin to cut a trade deal for gas, the US indicting 5 Chinese military officials for Cyber Theft (still scratching my head about that), China summoning US Ambassador Max Bacchus in response, and CNN's Christine Amanpour summoning Chinese Ambassador Cui Tian-kai for a pleasant chat about the mess on the floor.
A full transcript of the interview is here. Because CNN does not post videos to some countries, thankfully saving us from comedic drug ads, I cannot embed but you may find the videos here and here.
After the orange rag mop, some excerpts from the brief but interesting interview.
The polite Mr. Cui seldom disappoints and said much with few words. Amanpour is Amanpour, despite the setting in CNN’s studio. I hope you enjoy it, if you hit all the links and made it to here you deserve a break.
I recommend you read the Full Transcript and fair use is very limiting in this case; excuse the awkward cuts [ ... ] .
On the Indictment of 5 Officials for "Cybercrime" [ ... ] AMANPOUR: Yes, sir. I'm talking about the very major issue that has risen over the last 24 hours and that is that the United States has indicted five members of the Chinese army on an array of charges of stealing commercial and trade secrets. What is your reaction to that? CUI: You see, it's really amazing to see that some people still believe they have the moral high ground and credibility to accuse others if we consider the Snowden revelations and so on, so forth. And people still can do that. It's a bit incredible. (CROSSTALK) CUI: I think – I think the fact is China is a victim to such cyber attacks. There has been persistent and large-scale attacks on China's Internet, on China's government institutions, schools, universities, companies and even individuals. And these originate from the United States. So we have always requested the United States to give us a clear and thorough clarification. But we still have none of it yet. [ ... ] AMANPOUR: Well, let me ask you this, then, to react to the specific charges. The United States, as you obviously very well know, has laid out a detailed indictment and it has labeled 31 counts, which could carry a maximum of 277 years in jail. And it is asking you - and this is what the FBI is saying, the FBI director, if we fabricated all this, then come over to Pittsburgh and embarrass us by forcing us to put up or shut up and we will put up. That is a direct challenge from the FBI director. So if you're saying the U.S. is hypocritical, if you're denying what the United States is charging members of the Chinese PLA with, why not face the music, face the charges, send them over to Pittsburgh and have a jury, have lawyers and defend yourselves? CUI: And why don’t they come to Chinese court and explain themselves? AMANPOUR: Well, that – (CROSSTALK) CUI: You see Christiane, there used to be a working group on cybersecurity between the two governments. And it was agreed that the two governments should work together to fight such cyber attacks because it would certainly hurt the interests of both countries if we allow any cyber attacks to continue. And we requested the United States to provide us with any evidence they have. And we will certainly pursue these cases in accordance with our own laws. But they have never done that. [ ... ] AMANPOUR: Do you think that this is the beginning of a overt cyber war and a long-term cyber Cold War? CUI: We certainly don't want to see that. We are strongly opposed to that. But we cannot impose our choice on others. They have to make the right choice themselves. [ ... ]
[ ... ]
AMANPOUR: Yes, sir. I'm talking about the very major issue that has risen over the last 24 hours and that is that the United States has indicted five members of the Chinese army on an array of charges of stealing commercial and trade secrets.
What is your reaction to that?
CUI: You see, it's really amazing to see that some people still believe they have the moral high ground and credibility to accuse others if we consider the Snowden revelations and so on, so forth. And people still can do that.
It's a bit incredible.
(CROSSTALK)
CUI: I think – I think the fact is China is a victim to such cyber attacks. There has been persistent and large-scale attacks on China's Internet, on China's government institutions, schools, universities, companies and even individuals. And these originate from the United States. So we have always requested the United States to give us a clear and thorough clarification. But we still have none of it yet. [ ... ]
AMANPOUR: Well, let me ask you this, then, to react to the specific charges. The United States, as you obviously very well know, has laid out a detailed indictment and it has labeled 31 counts, which could carry a maximum of 277 years in jail. And it is asking you - and this is what the FBI is saying, the FBI director, if we fabricated all this, then come over to Pittsburgh and embarrass us by forcing us to put up or shut up and we will put up. That is a direct challenge from the FBI director.
So if you're saying the U.S. is hypocritical, if you're denying what the United States is charging members of the Chinese PLA with, why not face the music, face the charges, send them over to Pittsburgh and have a jury, have lawyers and defend yourselves?
CUI: And why don’t they come to Chinese court and explain themselves?
AMANPOUR: Well, that –
CUI: You see Christiane, there used to be a working group on cybersecurity between the two governments. And it was agreed that the two governments should work together to fight such cyber attacks because it would certainly hurt the interests of both countries if we allow any cyber attacks to continue. And we requested the United States to provide us with any evidence they have. And we will certainly pursue these cases in accordance with our own laws.
But they have never done that. [ ... ]
AMANPOUR: Do you think that this is the beginning of a overt cyber war and a long-term cyber Cold War?
CUI: We certainly don't want to see that. We are strongly opposed to that. But we cannot impose our choice on others. They have to make the right choice themselves. [ ... ]
I was very surprised to see this story get so little traction after the initial reports aside from tech blogs and foreign policy journals. I think the only diary mention on the subject was my own, which unfortunately, ended-up being kind of a pie-fight. I think going forward this will bee seen as a serious diplomatic error on the part of the US given the implicit hypocrisy involved and what seems to be a very ill-advised public swipe at China by a Justice Department that should have better things to do; I imaging this was over the strong objections of the State Department - unless it has come that far off the rails. Do I need to mention it is an invitation for other countries to start indicting US officials on a variety of charges? Strange decision.
On Relationship With Russia/Trade Deal/Uhraine AMANPOUR: So Ambassador Cui Tiankai, let me ask you precisely about this issue of the Russian president now meeting with President Xi in Shanghai and obviously there seems to be a great urgency on the part of Vladimir Putin to conclude an energy deal with China. This has been going on for a decade and you haven't been able to do it and haggling over the cost. Do you think now it will happen? CUI: Well, I think actually there are frequent and regular high-level exchanges between China and Russia, because the two countries are each other's biggest neighbor. We have ties of all kinds between the two countries. So such a regular high-level visit is just normal and President Putin is in Shanghai for a state visit and also to take part in an international conference. [ ... ] AMANPOUR: [ ... ] But let me ask you this, if China is such a pal of Russia's as you say, why then has China been studiously careful not to overtly take Russia's side, for instance, in the Security Council over the annexation of Crimea, over what is going on in Eastern Ukraine? Do you agree with the annexation of Crimea? CUI: We always follow our foreign policy that is independent, that is for peace, stability and development in the world. So we will make our own decision on the rights and wrongs of the issues themselves. We are not following any country's position. AMANPOUR: But just - you normally vote with Russia. You normally cast a veto together or you vote together; you have done over Syria and any number of issues that come to the Security Council. You didn’t in this regard. What worries you about what's happening in Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine, in that region? CUI: Well, first of all, if you check carefully the voting record of China in the United Nations Security Council, you could see a record of independence based on principles, not based on any other country's position. That's quite clear. Number two, we are indeed worried and concerned about the situation in Ukraine and that part of the world. We want to see the situation calm down and the Ukraine people could really decide their own development path and their own destiny. And we hope between Russia and the U.S. and Europe, you could - you can work things out through dialogue and a consultation. We don't want to see any escalation of the situation there. [ ... ]
AMANPOUR: So Ambassador Cui Tiankai, let me ask you precisely about this issue of the Russian president now meeting with President Xi in Shanghai and obviously there seems to be a great urgency on the part of Vladimir Putin to conclude an energy deal with China.
This has been going on for a decade and you haven't been able to do it and haggling over the cost.
Do you think now it will happen?
CUI: Well, I think actually there are frequent and regular high-level exchanges between China and Russia, because the two countries are each other's biggest neighbor. We have ties of all kinds between the two countries. So such a regular high-level visit is just normal and President Putin is in Shanghai for a state visit and also to take part in an international conference. [ ... ]
AMANPOUR: [ ... ] But let me ask you this, if China is such a pal of Russia's as you say, why then has China been studiously careful not to overtly take Russia's side, for instance, in the Security Council over the annexation of Crimea, over what is going on in Eastern Ukraine?
Do you agree with the annexation of Crimea?
CUI: We always follow our foreign policy that is independent, that is for peace, stability and development in the world. So we will make our own decision on the rights and wrongs of the issues themselves. We are not following any country's position.
AMANPOUR: But just - you normally vote with Russia. You normally cast a veto together or you vote together; you have done over Syria and any number of issues that come to the Security Council. You didn’t in this regard.
What worries you about what's happening in Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine, in that region?
CUI: Well, first of all, if you check carefully the voting record of China in the United Nations Security Council, you could see a record of independence based on principles, not based on any other country's position. That's quite clear.
Number two, we are indeed worried and concerned about the situation in Ukraine and that part of the world. We want to see the situation calm down and the Ukraine people could really decide their own development path and their own destiny. And we hope between Russia and the U.S. and Europe, you could - you can work things out through dialogue and a consultation.
We don't want to see any escalation of the situation there. [ ... ]
Cui is correct. In fact, Chinese policy on these matters is so consistent it's nearly 100% predictable (at least for Chinese!). And I think Amanpour answered her own question in asking it; the oil deal has been negotiating forever and was not hatched in response to events in Europe although they no doubt factored to some degree, but I'll say Chinese-Russian relations are based on equal parts intersecting interests and mutual mis-trust so lets see how it goes.
US Pivot to Asia AMANPOUR: Let me move onto President Obama and the pivot to Asia; as part of his tour of allies in Asia last month, he stopped very close to your region; he did not go to China. And his mandate, according to his officials, was to reassure allies of the U.S. support in all matters while not to threaten China. Do you believe that President Obama achieved that? CUI: Then you have to check the public opinion in China. AMANPOUR: I'm asking you as a government official. So tell me. CUI: Yes, I'm not questioning the intention of the U.S. government. I'm looking at the effect, the results of the U.S. policies towards Asia, towards China and what they have done and said recently. And honestly, I think the key to this rebalancing is to maintain a good relationship with everybody in Asia Pacific, including particularly China. And in this sense, I think this policy of rebalancing might need some rebalancing itself. [ ... ]
AMANPOUR: Let me move onto President Obama and the pivot to Asia; as part of his tour of allies in Asia last month, he stopped very close to your region; he did not go to China. And his mandate, according to his officials, was to reassure allies of the U.S. support in all matters while not to threaten China.
Do you believe that President Obama achieved that?
CUI: Then you have to check the public opinion in China.
AMANPOUR: I'm asking you as a government official. So tell me.
CUI: Yes, I'm not questioning the intention of the U.S. government. I'm looking at the effect, the results of the U.S. policies towards Asia, towards China and what they have done and said recently. And honestly, I think the key to this rebalancing is to maintain a good relationship with everybody in Asia Pacific, including particularly China. And in this sense, I think this policy of rebalancing might need some rebalancing itself. [ ... ]
Cui +10 Touché.
Territorial Conflict with Vietnam AMANPOUR: Right. But they sort of criticize you for using the airspace and even what's going on in Vietnam right now, having an oil rig in waters that are clearly claimed by one and disputed. You're even having to send - you're even having to send ships to evacuate your citizens from Vietnam. Why is China sort of tweaking everybody's nose over these issues? CUI: Now let me get the facts straight on the issue with Vietnam. First, the Chinese companies operating only 17 nautical miles off a Chinese island and it's 150 miles from the Vietnamese coast, that's number one. Number two, this is our only oil drilling operation in the area. But Vietnam is operating more than 30 such drilling operations, all in the disputed areas. Unlike our only one, we are doing it in undisputed areas. Number three, we have only civilian ships, government ships there. But the Vietnamese have military vessels, armed vessels. That - these are the facts. And also you mentioned what happened, what is happening still in Vietnam, they are attacking foreign companies; they are burning down factories; they are killing innocent people there. I think what is happening in Vietnam is of the same nature as what is happening at the sea. This is quite clear. [ ... ]
AMANPOUR: Right. But they sort of criticize you for using the airspace and even what's going on in Vietnam right now, having an oil rig in waters that are clearly claimed by one and disputed. You're even having to send - you're even having to send ships to evacuate your citizens from Vietnam.
Why is China sort of tweaking everybody's nose over these issues?
CUI: Now let me get the facts straight on the issue with Vietnam. First, the Chinese companies operating only 17 nautical miles off a Chinese island and it's 150 miles from the Vietnamese coast, that's number one.
Number two, this is our only oil drilling operation in the area. But Vietnam is operating more than 30 such drilling operations, all in the disputed areas. Unlike our only one, we are doing it in undisputed areas.
Number three, we have only civilian ships, government ships there. But the Vietnamese have military vessels, armed vessels. That - these are the facts. And also you mentioned what happened, what is happening still in Vietnam, they are attacking foreign companies; they are burning down factories; they are killing innocent people there. I think what is happening in Vietnam is of the same nature as what is happening at the sea. This is quite clear. [ ... ]
Pretty serious business and a problem that will take years to work out. I'm only going to say the misadventures of Gates and Clinton in stirring conflicts in an attempt to contain China may me very apprehensive about a Clinton Presidency at least where it comes to Foreign Policy. Quite a bit of Necon baggage she's carrying.
On Pronunciation of Cui Tiān-kǎi AMANPOUR: Let me get it right; I'm sorry. I mispronounced your first name. (OFF MIKE COMMENTS) AMANPOUR: Ambassador Cui Tiankai – (CROSSTALK) (OFF MIKE COMMENTS) AMANPOUR: Ambassador Cui Tiankai, thank you very much indeed for joining me. CUI: Thank you. This time it's much better. (LAUGHTER)
AMANPOUR: Let me get it right; I'm sorry. I mispronounced your first name.
(OFF MIKE COMMENTS)
AMANPOUR: Ambassador Cui Tiankai –
AMANPOUR: Ambassador Cui Tiankai, thank you very much indeed for joining me.
CUI: Thank you. This time it's much better.
(LAUGHTER)
OK. Christiane does not speak Putonghua.
I wonder how the discussion between Max Bacchus and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi went.
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